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Finding common law duty of care from
statutory duties: All within the Anns framework
Gary Chan Kok Yew*
This paper examines the relationship between statutory duties and the
common law duty of care in the tort of negligence. There are apparently
divergent judicial statements on the general approach towards the duty of care
to be owed by persons under a statutory duty. One central question arises:
must the plaintiff show that the Parliament intended, through the statute, to
confer a private right of action thereby imposing a common law duty of care, or
should the courts treat the common law duty as subsisting generally unless it
is excluded by the statute? This article argues that the two approaches may be
properly accommodated within the two-stage duty of care test in Anns v
Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, which has been applied in
Canada, New Zealand and Singapore. It further discusses how statutory
duties may impact on the specific elements (proximity and policy consider-
ations) within the Anns framework. The analysis will promote greater legal
coherence in this complex area of tort law and thereby assist courts to better
tailor their decisions in a more consistent and principled manner.
INTRODUCTION
The potential reach of statutory provisions that impose duties is extremely wide, covering a myriad of
factual contexts such as employment, public health and safety, finance, and other regulatory contexts.
Statutory duties may be imposed on both private entities including natural and artificial persons,
employers, and occupiers of premises, as well as public authorities and agencies. These duties carry
diverse consequences in the event of a statutory breach, such as personal injury, property damage, and
economic loss. The English Court of Appeal in the pre-war case of Kent v East Suffolk Rivers
Catchment Board1 remarked that “[t]he case law as to the duties and liabilities of a statutory body to
members of the public is in a state of lamentable obscurity and confusion”. More than six decades
later, Lord Steyn in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Council2 (Gorringe) echoing the same
sentiments, stated that the relationship between negligence and statutory duties is “a subject of great
complexity and very much an evolving area of the law”.3 It is still a complex and evolving area of law
in 2016, not only in England, but also in other parts of the Commonwealth, including Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and Singapore.
The common law duty of care, together with standard of care and proof of damage, forms the
bedrock of an action in the tort of negligence. With respect to duty of care, the Canadian, New
Zealand and Singapore courts apply a legal test resembling in substance Lord Wilberforce’s dictum in
Anns v Merton London Borough Council4 (the “Anns framework”). In Singapore, the legal test
enunciated in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency5 (Spandeck)
comprising the requirement of proximity and policy considerations, is essentially a restatement of the
Anns framework. The Supreme Court of Canada in Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD6 (Syl
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University. I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the
funding by Office of Research, Singapore Management University and the research assistance provided by Khairul Ashraf.
1 Kent v East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board [1940] 1 KB 319, 332.
2 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15.
3 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [2].
4 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728.
5 Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; [2007] SGCA 37.
6 Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD [2007] 3 SCR 83; [2007] SCC 38.
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Apps) held that one requirement of the common law duty of care is the presence of “sufficient
proximity between [the parties] such that it would be fair and just to impose a duty of care”.7
Similarly, in New Zealand, there are two broad fields of inquiry in the duty of care issue: (i) the degree
of proximity or relationship between the parties, and (ii) whether there are policy considerations
negativing or restricting the duty of care.8 The Privy Council in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin9
(Invercargill) subsequently confirmed this legal test for duty of care. Hence, notwithstanding minor
variations which will be discussed below, the courts in Singapore, Canada and New Zealand all
employ the Anns framework containing the elements of proximity and policy considerations in
establishing a duty of care in negligence.
This article is concerned with the relationship between the duties imposed under statute and the
establishment of a common law duty of care in the tort of negligence. Two different approaches can be
discerned. The first approach is that, in respect of a particular statutory duty, the court must be
satisfied that Parliament intended, via the statute, to create a private law remedy, thereby imposing a
common law duty of care. The alternative approach is that the court should treat the common law duty
as already subsisting unless there is evidence that Parliament intended to exclude such a private
remedy. In Gorringe, Lord Steyn preferred the latter approach for duty of care in negligence whilst
noting that the former approach applies to the tort of breach of statutory duty.10 On the other hand,
there are Commonwealth cases suggesting that to establish the existence of a common law duty of
care, the plaintiff must show that the Parliament intended to confer a private right of action on a class
of persons including the plaintiff. This is tantamount to stating that the Parliament must intend to
confer a private right of action on a class of persons before a common law duty can be established in
favour of that class. If this is the case, there does not appear to be any distinction between the
establishment of a duty of care in negligence and right of private action in the tort of breach of
statutory duty.
The differing judicial approaches as described above appear to be fundamental. They go to the
root of the tort of negligence itself and the appropriate circumstances in which a common law duty of
care would arise from a statutory framework. In this regard, there is a need to compare and evaluate
the concept of duty of care in negligence set against a statutory duty framework, and also to analyse
how the statutory duties impact on the specific elements (in particular proximity and policy
considerations) within the duty of care framework. An understanding of the specific elements and
circumstances giving rise to a duty of care should assist courts to better tailor their decisions in a
consistent and principled manner, as well as provide a general framework for analysing the proper
relationship between statutory duties and duty of care in negligence – thereby lending legal coherence
to this complex and evolving area of law.
The analysis outlined above would be relevant for assessing the potential legal risks to which
statutory bodies are subject under the law of negligence and the possible steps they can take to
mitigate these risks.11 For public authorities, there may be additional special considerations relating to
the justiciability of policy decisions, the policy/operational distinction, and the ambit and exercise of
statutory discretion,12 all of which are beyond the scope of this article. The primary focus here is on
the fit between the two frameworks: the statutory duty framework, and the Anns framework as applied
in Canada, New Zealand and Singapore in relation to statutory entities generally. However, the
discussion would also be relevant for the other common law jurisdictions (England and Australia) due
to their broad similarities in approaching duty of care issues.
7 Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD [2007] 3 SCR 83; [2007] SCC 38, [34].
8 South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282.
9 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] AC 624.
10 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [3].
11 See Freya Kristjanson and Stephen Moreau, “Regulatory Negligence and Administrative Law” (2012) 25 Can J Admin L &
Prac 104.
12 See, eg, Brown v British Columbia [1994] 1 SCR 420; X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995]
UKHL 9.
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To set the stage proper for analysing the relationship between statutory duties and common law
duty of care, we should begin with the Anns framework. This is followed by a description of the
apparent divergence between the approach based on parliamentary intention to create a private
remedy, and the approach treating the common law duty of care as already subsisting unless excluded
by parliamentary intention. Subsequent is an explanation of the different bases for the tort of
negligence and breach of statutory duty. The author will then build on this explanation to
accommodate the two apparently conflicting approaches within the broad Anns framework.
THE ANNS FRAMEWORK AND DUTY OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE
In Anns v Merton London Borough Council (Anns), the lessee of a flat sued the Council for failing to
carry out inspections of the flat, an omission which led to economic loss to the lessee due to
inadequate foundations of the structure. With respect to the issue of whether the Council owed a duty
of care to the lessee, Lord Wilberforce outlined the Anns framework:
[I]n order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the
facts of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been held to exist.
Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a suffıcient relationship of proximity
or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may
be likely to cause damage to the latter – in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the
first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is
owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise …13
Notwithstanding the words “sufficient relationship of proximity”, certain judges14 have interpreted
the Anns framework as comprising foreseeability at the first stage and policy considerations at the
second. Moreover, in the first sentence of the passage quoted above, Lord Wilberforce seemed to
suggest that it is not necessary to refer to precedents when determining whether or not a particular
situation gives rise to a duty of care. Due to the judicial concern with the near “universal” breadth of
Lord Wilberforce’s formulation in which a prima facie duty of care could arise from the mere
presence of foreseeability, the Anns framework did not gain traction and was subsequently rejected in
England.15 Instead, the English courts preferred the three-part test (of foreseeability, proximity, and
policy considerations – namely, whether the imposition of a duty of care was fair, just, and reasonable)
articulated in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman16 (Caparo), a case involving allegations of negligent
auditing of company accounts by the auditors. In contrast to the “universal” formula in Anns, duty of
care in Caparo was based on the traditional categories of cases in which negligence liability has been
established. Thus, the Caparo test envisioned a more cautious and incremental approach to duty of
care.17
Despite its domestic rejection, the Anns framework has found favour further afield amongst the
common law jurisdictions in Canada, New Zealand and Singapore.18 For these jurisdictions, the focus
at the first stage of proximity is the closeness of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.
In Singapore, the Spandeck approach to duty of care, substantially similar to the two-stage test of
proximity (in lieu of mere foreseeability) and policy considerations in Anns, is preceded by a
preliminary threshold of factual foreseeability. The Singapore Court of Appeal in Spandeck endorsed
13 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751–752 (emphasis added).
14 See, eg, Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 632 (Lord Oliver); in Australia, Sutherland Shire Council v
Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 506–507 (Deane J), overruled without disturbing this point.
15 See Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.
16 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
17 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 618 (Lord Bridge), 628 (Lord Roskill).
18 On Singapore, see Gary Chan Kok Yew and Lee Pey Woan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (Academy Publishing, 2nd ed,
2011), Chs 3–5.
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Deane J’s dictum in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman19 (Sutherland) on the importance of finding
physical, circumstantial, and causal proximity supported by voluntary assumption of responsibility and
reasonable reliance. Post-Spandeck, other factors, such as vulnerability of the plaintiff,20 and the
degree of control exercised by the defendant,21 have been utilised as part of the proximity
requirement. It is recognised that the notion of proximity cannot be wholly contained in a definitional
straitjacket.22
At the second stage of the Anns framework, policy considerations, strictly speaking, serve to
negate or restrict the prima facie duty which might have been established under the proximity stage.
However, policy considerations, consisting of “broad social welfare goals” and the “balancing of
competing moral claims”,23 may in particular cases support the existence of a duty of care,24 or even
affirm the absence of a duty at the first stage.25 Further, as was made clear by the Court of Appeal of
Singapore in Spandeck, the Anns framework is not treated as a universal formula for duty of care
without recourse to precedents; rather, courts should consciously draw analogies to decided cases at
both stages when applying the framework to determine duty of care (an “incremental” approach).26
As highlighted above, the duty of care test in Spandeck closely resembles the existing New
Zealand27 and Canadian approaches premised on the Anns framework of proximity and policy
considerations. The Canadian test in Syl Apps laid out three enquiries:28 (1) whether the harm
complained of was reasonably foreseeable; (2) whether there was sufficient proximity between the
parties such that it would be fair and just to impose a duty of care; and (3) whether there were residual
policy reasons for declining to impose a duty arisen under the second stage. In Canada, the
requirement of proximity in the second stage involves examining factors such as expectations,
representations, reliance, property and other interests.29 Further, unlike the Spandeck test which
explicitly demarcated proximity in the first stage from policy considerations in the second, proximity
and policy considerations intersect at the second stage of the Syl Apps test. Nonetheless, the Singapore
courts have recognised that, in particular circumstances, the existence of a contractual matrix between
the parties can impinge on both proximity and policy considerations.30 As we shall see below, the
statutory duty framework would also relevant at both stages of the Anns framework.
19 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 497–498 (cited with approval in Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd
v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; [2007] SGCA 37, [78]).
20 Anwar Patrick Adrian v Ng Chong & Hue LLC [2014] 3 SLR 761; [2014] SGCA 34, [154].
21 Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Moh Seng Cranes Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 360; [2014] SGCA 6, [41].
22 See Toh Siew Kee v Ho Ah Lam Ferrocement (Pte) Ltd [2013] 3 SLR 284; [2013] SGCA 29, [129] (Sundaresh Menon JA:
“These are not meant to be exhaustive factors; nor … is an attempt to define legal proximity going to be fruitful. But, these
factors enable the court to assess each fact situation within a framework that affords a considerable measure of flexibility”
(emphasis in original)).
23 Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; [2007] SGCA 37, [85].
24 See, eg, RSP Architects Planners & Engineers v Ocean Front Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR(R) 653; [1995] SGCA 79, [75]; RSP
Architects Planners & Engineers (formerly known as Raglan Squire & Partners FE) v Management Corporation Strata Title
Plan No 1075 [1999] 2 SLR(R) 134; [1999] SGCA 30, [41].
25 Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; [2007] SGCA 37, [114];
Ngiam Kong Seng v Lim Chiew Hock [2008] 3 SLR(R) 674; [2008] SGCA 23, [143]–[145] – though there was, strictly
speaking, no need for the judges in these cases to refer to policy considerations, as a prima facie duty of care had not been
established at the first stage.
26 Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; [2007] SGCA 37, [73].
27 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] AC 624; Body Corporate No 207624 v North Shore City Council [2013] 2 NZLR
297; [2012] NZSC 83.
28 Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v BD [2007] 3 SCR 83; [2007] SCC 38, [34].
29 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537; [2001] SCC 79.
30 See, eg, Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v Defence Science & Technology Agency [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100; [2007] SGCA 37,
[108], [114]; and Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146; [2011] SGCA 2, [66].
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The New Zealand courts adopt a similar approach to duty of care as Singapore, by differentiating
the proximity requirement from policy considerations. In North Shore City Council v Attorney-
General,31 the New Zealand Supreme Court held that the Building Industry Authority did not owe a
duty of care to the Council for the negligent preparation of a report which, the Council alleged, led to
the lawsuit by owners of leaky buildings against the Council. This decision was based on the
requirement of proximity in which “the defendant may be said to be under an obligation to be mindful
of a plaintiff’s legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs”,32 which is akin to the concept of
“interpersonal justice”.33 At the second stage of the test, the court must consider the “wider effects of
its decision on society and on the law generally”, including issues such as the “capacity of each party
to insure against the liability, the likely behaviour of other potential defendants in reaction to the
decision, and the consistency of imposition of liability with the legal system more generally”.34 There
is therefore a conceptual separation within the Anns framework, particularly in New Zealand and
Singapore, between, on the one hand, the individual rights and obligations encapsulated in the
requirement of proximity, and, on the other hand, the macro policy concerns and communitarian
interests beyond the litigants’ rights and obligations, at the second stage of the enquiry.35
In contrast to Singapore, Canada and New Zealand, Australia’s judicial approach to duty of care
relies on a multitude of factors (such as reasonable foreseeability of loss, indeterminacy of liability,
autonomy of the individual, vulnerability to risk and knowledge of risk)36 rather than a single legal
test such as the Anns framework. Proximity as a legal requirement is doubted. In Sullivan v Moody,
the High Court of Australia stated that “[proximity] gives little practical guidance in determining
whether a duty of care exists in cases that are not analogous to cases in which a duty has been
established”.37 Nevertheless, it has been conceded that “the factors which were apt to be included” in
“the concept of ‘proximity’ as a touchstone of the existence of a duty of care … remain relevant”.38 It
has been argued that the use of multiple factors in Australia may find resonance with factual features
relating to the “substantive pathways to harm” between the parties (which is relevant for proximity) as
well as normative reasoning about rights and obligations (which relate to policy considerations).39
From this brief survey, it is clear that there are broad similarities between the judicial approaches
to determining the existence of a duty of care in negligence in Australia, Canada, England, New
Zealand and Singapore, all of which essentially rely on the elements of foreseeability, proximity and
policy considerations (that is, fairness, justice and reasonableness). However, though the elements may
be similar, the legal tests employed by the Australian and English courts are different from the Anns
framework. On the other hand, in Canada, New Zealand and Singapore, the courts follow a staged
process of enquiry resembling the Anns framework, in which policy considerations may, as a last
resort of sorts, negate any duty of care that may previously arise based on proximity. For Canada, the
elements of proximity and policy considerations are conflated, whilst the general approach in New
Zealand and Singapore is to separate them.
31 North Shore City Council v Attorney-General [2012] 3 NZLR 341; [2012] NZSC 49.
32 North Shore City Council v Attorney-General [2012] 3 NZLR 341; [2012] NZSC 49, [153].
33 Andrew Robertson, “Policy-based Reasoning in Duty of Care Cases” (2013) 33(1) LS 119; Andrew Robertson, “On the
Function of the Law of Negligence” (2013) 33(1) Oxford J Legal Stud 31.
34 North Shore City Council v Attorney-General [2012] 3 NZLR 341; [2012] NZSC 49, [160].
35 Andrew Phang, Cheng Lim Saw and Gary Chan, “Of Precedent, Theory and Practice – The Case For A Return to Anns”
[2006] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 1, 38–40.
36 See Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180; [1999] HCA 36, [133] (McHugh J).
37 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; [2001] HCA 59, [48].
38 Owners – Strata Plan No 61288 v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 479; [2013] NSWCA 317, [24],
overruled without disturbing this point. The statement was cited with approval in the overruling decision of Brookfield Multiplex
Ltd v Owners – Strata Plan No 61288 (2014) 254 CLR 185; [2014] HCA 36, [21] (French CJ).
39 David Tan and Goh Yihan, “The Promise of Universality: The Spandeck Formulation Half a Decade On” (2013) 25 Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 510, [18]; and Christian Witting, “Tort Law, Policy and the High Court of Australia’” (2007)
Melbourne University Law Review 569, 570, 573.
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IS IT ABOUT CREATING, OR EXCLUDING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION, PRIVATE
REMEDY, AND COMMON LAW DUTY?
Insofar as statutory duties are concerned, under the Anns framework, the court enquires at the first
stage whether the statutory body or entity owes a duty of care based on proximity, and at the second
stage, whether the duty, if established, should be negated or limited due to policy considerations. To
what extent should one gather from the relevant statutory scheme whether a common law duty of care
in negligence should be established? One general approach is that discussed in Gorringe.40 In that
case, the plaintiff alleged that the highway authority caused the accident that led to her personal injury
by failing to give her proper warning of dangers on the road surface. Lord Steyn referred to the
distinction between negligence and breach of statutory duty as follows:
[I]n a case founded on breach of statutory duty the central question is whether from the provisions and
structure of the statute an intention can be gathered to create a private law remedy? In contradistinction
in a case framed in negligence, against the background of a statutory duty or power, a basic question is
whether the statute excludes a private law remedy? An assimilation of the two enquiries will sometimes
produce wrong results.41
Lord Steyn’s proposition in Gorringe based on the exclusion of a private remedy has been cited
by several English courts.42 Lord Hoffmann in Gorringe described the issue in similar terms: “the
question is not whether [the common law duty] is created by the statute but whether the terms of the
statute … are sufficient to exclude it”.43
There does not appear to be any material difference between Lord Steyn’s and Lord Hoffmann’s
judicial formulations. The context of the pronouncements essentially concerned whether a common
law duty of care should arise given a statutory background. Damage is the gist of the action in
negligence. Common law duty of care encompasses a duty to take reasonable care not to cause
damage or injury of a certain type to a particular class of persons that includes the plaintiff.44 Thus, the
concept of a private remedy for the plaintiff is inextricably linked with the duty of care issue. If a
common law duty exists, assuming the proof of breach of duty and damage, the plaintiff would be
entitled to a private remedy for the defendant’s statutory breach. Conversely, if the private remedy for
the statutory breach were to be excluded by the statute, a common law duty would not arise.
In line with Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann’s approaches in Gorringe, Gummow and Hayne JJ in
the Australian decision of Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan45 (Graham Barclay) affirmed that:
[T]he discernment of an affirmative legislative intent that a common law duty exists, is not, and has
never been, a necessary pre-condition to the recognition of such a duty. This may be contrasted with the
action for breach of statutory duty, the doctrinal basis of which is identified as legislative intention.46
In essence, statutory intention is not the primary source of a common law duty of care in the tort
of negligence, unlike for the tort of breach of statutory duty. In Sutherland, Mason J stated, in a
similar vein, that:
[T]he proposition that a public authority is not liable at the suit of an individual for damages for breach
of statutory duty unless the statute on its true construction manifests an intention to confer a civil cause
of action has no application to the liability of an authority for breach of a common law duty of care.47
On the other hand, there are judicial statements that suggest a different approach to describing this
complex relationship between statutory duties and the common law duty of care. It is recognised, as in
40 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [3].
41 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [3] (emphasis added).
42 Connor v Surrey County Council [2011] 1 QB 429, [98]; X v Hounslow LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 1242, [40]; Rice v Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry [2007] PIQR P23, [37] (May LJ).
43 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [38] (emphasis added).
44 MA Jones, “Negligence” in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st ed, 2014), [8.05].
45 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; [2002] HCA 54.
46 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; [2002] HCA 54, [148].
47 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 459.
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the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Cooper v Hobart,48 (Cooper) that depending on the facts of
a particular case, the statute49 might be “the only source of … duties, private or public”.50 Hence,
whether a common law duty of care will arise would depend solely on whether it can be directly
derived from the statutory source.
Further, the Court of Appeal of Singapore in the decision of Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction
Pte Ltd51 (Tan Juay Pah) referred to a guideline for ascertaining the common law duty of care in
negligence as follows:
[T]he party seeking to establish that a private right of action exists for a breach of statutory duty must
show that Parliament, in imposing the statutory duty in question to protect the members of a class,
intended those members to have such a right of action. Here, it must also be borne in mind that such
right is not immediately established just because a statute is intended to protect a particular class of
persons. Ordinarily, something more is required to demonstrate a statutory intention to confer a private
right of action. In matters where the statute’s objective is to protect the public in general, exceptionally
clear language will be required before an intention to confer a private remedy for a breach of statutory
duty can be established.52
That case was squarely concerned with the question of whether a common law duty of care ought
to be owed by an authorised examiner of cranes, who was operating under the Workplace Safety and
Health Act53 and Regulations,54 to contractors of a construction project. There was no action based on
the tort of breach of statutory duty, only the negligence claim. The above guideline enunciated by the
Court, in requiring that Parliament must have intended to confer the plaintiff with a right of civil
action for the establishment of a common law duty, appears, on the face of it, inconsistent with the
general approach towards statutory duties and duty of care taken in Gorringe, Graham Barclay, and
Sutherland. Moreover, the threshold for showing the existence of a parliamentary intention to confer a
private right of action appears to be high, requiring “exceptionally clear language” where the statutory
purpose is to protect the public in general. In this connection, the Court of Appeal in Tan Juay Pah
added in the same judgment that “a concurrent common law duty of care may be found alongside a
statutory duty imposed by subsidiary legislation provided there are clear indications that the primary
legislation contemplates the creation of such a common law duty”.55
The above position in Tan Juay Pah seems to find support in Lord Scott’s remark in Gorringe that
he does not accept “that a common law duty of care can grow parasitically out of a statutory duty not
intended to be owed to individuals”.56 His Lordship also stated that:
[I]f a statutory duty does not give rise to a private right to sue for breach, the duty cannot create a duty
of care that would not have been owed at common law if the statute were not there. If the policy of the
statute is not consistent with the creation of a statutory liability to pay compensation for damage caused
by a breach of the statutory duty, the same policy would, in my opinion, exclude the use of the statutory
duty in order to create a common law duty of care …57
The upshot of Lord Scott’s remark is that where the statutory provision in question does not
confer a private right of action on an individual plaintiff, the statutory body or entity would not owe a
common law duty to the plaintiff, a stance consistent with the guideline expressed in Tan Juay Pah.
48 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537; [2001] SCC 79.
49 In the case of Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537; [2001] SCC 79, the Mortgage Brokers Act, RSBC 1996, c 313.
50 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537; [2001] SCC 79, [43].
51 Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 549; [2012] SGCA 17.
52 Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 549; [2012] SGCA 17, [54] (VK Rajah JA for the Court).
53 Workplace Safety and Health Act (Singapore, cap 354A, 2009 rev ed).
54 Workplace Safety and Health (General Provisions) Regulations (Singapore, cap 354A, Rg 1, 2007 rev ed).
55 Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 549; [2012] SGCA 17, [54] (emphasis added).
56 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [71].
57 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [71] (emphasis added).
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As we have seen in Gorringe, there is no consensus amongst Lord Steyn, Lord Hoffmann and
Lord Scott on the proper approach towards the common law duty of care against the backdrop of a
particular statutory regime. Similarly, the High Court of Australia in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry
Finance Committee58 appeared to be divided as to whether the common law duty, or the statutory
regime, should be in the foreground. Gaudron J, for instance, adopted the view that the statutory body
operates within the common law and that common law applies unless excluded by the statute.59
Gummow and Kirby JJ, on the other hand, took the statute rather than the common law as the starting
point of analysis.60
The Gorringe approach as expressed by Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann is relatively more
amenable to the establishment of a common law duty of care, since it presupposes the existence of a
common law duty unless the duty has been excluded by statutory intention. That is, the approach
prioritises the general position of the common law over of the legislative view, though this is subject
to clear statutory intention to the contrary. One clear example of such statutory intention would be the
presence of a statutory immunity provision excluding negligence liability of the defendant in question.
Where proof of parliamentary intention to confer a right of private action on the plaintiff is
required for a common law duty of care, as stated in Tan Juay Pah, it is relatively more difficult to
establish a common law duty of care from statutory duties. Here, in contrast to the approach of
Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann in Gorringe, the legislative position is prioritised even in the
development of the common law tort of negligence where statutory duties are involved. In fact, it was
stated in the case that where the statutory purpose is to protect the public in general, exceptionally
clear language will be required. The plaintiff’s burden to establish a common law duty appears
especially onerous in cases where, as stated in Tan Juay Pah, the statutory duty is imposed by
subsidiary legislation rather than the parent statute, or where the statute provides for the protection of
the public in general as opposed to an identifiable class of persons.
Further, the default position in the tort of breach of statutory duty is that, in the event that the
statute provides for criminal sanctions for the breach, or is silent about remedies, provided there is no
limited class of persons sought to be protected by the statute, Parliament would not have intended to
confer a private right of action.61 It is a fairly common phenomenon for statutes to either impose
criminal penalties or remain silent on remedies for statutory breaches. Hence, if the test for common
law duty of care in negligence is to be equivalent to or closely aligned with that for the tort of breach
of statutory duty, a common law duty would be unlikely to arise in cases of a statutory duty.
DISTINGUISHING THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE FROM THE TORT OF BREACH OF
STATUTORY DUTY
Given the possible ramifications of the different approaches towards statutory duties and the common
law duty of care, a cogent explanation and clarification of the appropriate approach is called for. As
we have seen above, underlying the differences between the judicial approaches based on the creation
and the exclusion of a private remedy and common law duty of care, is the conceptual distinction
between the tort of negligence set against a statutory framework, and the tort of breach of statutory
duty.62
First and foremost, there does not exist a common law tort of “careless performance of a statutory
duty”. Instead, in the common law world, there are two separate torts: negligence and breach of
statutory duty. Further, there is no necessary connection between the presence and scope of statutory
duties and a duty of care in negligence. Though a statutory duty per se does not necessarily arise from
58 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 59; see also Martin Davies, “Common
Law Liability of Statutory Authorities: Crimmins v. Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee” (2000) 8 TLJ 133.
59 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR1; [1999] HCA 59, [26].
60 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR1; [1999] HCA 59, [159] (Gummow J), [203] (Kirby J).
61 Atkinson v Newcastle Waterworks Company (1877) 2 Ex D 441; Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173;
X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] UKHL 9.
62 See London Passenger Transport Board v Upson [1949] AC 155, 168.
Finding common law duty of care from statutory duties: All within the Anns framework
(2016) 24 Tort L Rev 14 21
and is not equivalent to a common law duty of care, statutory duties may “form the backdrop to and
inform the existence (or lack thereof) of a common law duty of care”.63 The proper approach is
therefore to assess the actual relationship between the parties and use “the statutory framework as, at
most, the context or explanation for these interactions”.64
The differences in the judicial approaches, it is argued, may be rationalised based on the nature
and purposes of the two different and separate torts. The common law duty of care in negligence is
part of the general law, and is prima facie separate and independent from statute, in contrast to the tort
of breach of statutory duty, which is necessarily tied to statute.65 Moreover, the essence of the
common law duty in negligence is based on reasonable care, which is conceptually distinct from that
in breach of statutory duty.
Whether a statutory duty would give rise to a claim in the tort of breach of statutory duty depends,
as a starting point, on whether Parliament intended to confer a private right of civil action flowing
from the alleged breach of statute.66 It is clear that a provision that expressly stipulates an action based
on “breach of statutory duty” and/or a civil remedy in the event of a breach, confers such a private
right of action. On other occasions, the statute may specify the pre-conditions before a private right of
action will arise. The position is less clear where the statutory provision is silent on the civil
consequences of a breach. As a general principle, a private right of action will arise if “the statutory
duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and … Parliament intended to
confer on members of that class a private right of action for breach of the duty”.67 For example, a
statutory duty that is stipulated for the benefit of a specific class of persons68 in the absence of
criminal sanctions, judicial review, and other alternative remedies is more likely to confer a private
right of civil action. The courts are also more likely to allow a tortious action in breach of statutory
duty simpliciter in cases involving employer responsibility for workers’ physical safety.69 On the other
hand, statutory provisions that confer the benefit on the general public,70 stipulate for criminal
sanctions and alternative statutory remedies in event of a breach,71 or permit the statutory authority
wide discretion in carrying out a public duty such as the promotion of social welfare, generally are not
likely to give rise to a private right of action.72 That being said, the availability of judicial review
should not be treated as conceptually equivalent to common law remedies in negligence or even
breach of statutory duty; the former remedy is forward-looking in getting the official to fulfill a duty,
whilst the latter remedy looks to the past for compensation.73 The presence of alternative statutory
remedies is not conclusive against a common law duty of care.
In contrast, for a common law duty of care in negligence to be established, it is argued that there
is, strictly speaking, no need for the courts to ascertain if Parliament had, by enacting the statutory
provisions, intended to confer a private right of action. For the tort of negligence, what the plaintiff is
strictly required to show is that the elements in the Anns framework are satisfied in order to establish
63 Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146; [2011] SGCA 2, [22].
64 Lewis Klar, “Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v B.D.: Looking for Proximity within Statutory Provisions” (2007) 86
Canadian Bar Review 337, 340.
65 One caveat is that the common law duty, though it may arise independently of statute, is ultimately subject to contrary
statutory intention. This will be discussed in detail later in this article.
66 Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146; [2011] SGCA 2, [24].
67 Loh Luan Choo Betsy v Foo Wah Jek [2005] 1 SLR 64; [2004] SGHC 230, [25] (citing X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County
Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] UKHL 9, 731).
68 Loh Luan Choo Betsy v Foo Wah Jek [2005] 1 SLR 64; [2004] SGHC 230, [25].
69 Xu Ren Li v Nakano Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 729; [2011] SGHC 197; Groves v Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402.
70 Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832, 840 (Bankes LJ).
71 MCST Plan No. 586 v Menezes Ignatius Augustine [1992] 1 SLR(R) 201.
72 O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC 188.
73 Mark Aronson, “Government Liability in Negligence” (2008) 32 MULR 44, 66.
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a common law duty of care. The Anns framework is sufficiently broad to cater to a variety of fact
situations, including in the event of a statutory breach.
There are, admittedly, judicial statements suggesting that the non-availability of a claim for
breach of statutory duty would necessarily lead to a corresponding failure in the negligence claim.
However, those statements can be explained when read in the context of the entire judgment. For
instance, Lord Hoffmann in Gorringe, commenting on the case of O’Rourke v Camden London
Borough Council,74 stated that, in the absence of a right to sue for breach of statutory duty, it would be
absurd to hold that the council was under a common law duty of care to provide accommodation for
homeless persons.75 His Lordship explained that Gorringe was not concerned with cases where public
authorities have “actually done acts or entered into relationships or undertaken responsibilities which
give rise to a common law duty of care”76 – that is, the statute is the only source of common law duty
of care. This statement suggests that such acts, relationships or undertakings, where present in a
particular case, should be independently assessed for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of a
duty of care in negligence. Hence, the absence of a right to sue in the tort of breach of statutory duty
does not necessarily mean that there is no common law duty of care in negligence.
On the distinction between the tort of negligence and breach of statutory duty simpliciter, it
should be recognised that the duty of care in negligence is part of the common law and prima facie
separate and independent from statute. The duty of care in the tort of negligence has developed apace
since the time of Donoghue v Stevenson77 (Donoghue) by judges in areas outside the purview of
statutes. In extending the “neighbour principle” in Donoghue to, for example, cases of economic loss
for negligent misstatement in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd,78 and psychiatric harm
in McLoughlin v O’Brian,79 the common law developments have taken place alongside, rather than
emanating from, statutory developments. This general approach to the common law duty of care in
negligence should apply even in a case where a statutory duty is imposed on the defendant. The
two-stage test of proximity and policy considerations in Anns that has built upon the “neighbour
principle” should be the guiding approach for duty of care in negligence regardless of the existence of
a statutory backdrop. That said, however, the Anns framework cannot, and should not, disregard the
statutory backdrop. In line with the secondary rules of a proper and functioning legal system, it is
clear that statutes possess the potential power to override common law principles if Parliament so
intends; where statutory and common law rules do conflict, the statute will prevail. This is particularly
pertinent when we consider the specific elements within the Anns framework below.
The prima facie independence of a common law duty of care from statute is aptly illustrated in the
case of Bux v Slough Metals Ltd.80 In that case, the plaintiff employee was not entitled to claim for
breach of statutory duty simpliciter since the regulations81 only required that employees be provided
with suitable goggles, and the employers had complied with the regulations. However, the employee
successfully claimed in negligence against the employer for failing to instruct the employee to wear
the goggles.82 Stephenson LJ described the relationship between the common law duty of care and the
statutory duty as follows:
There is, in my judgment, no presumption that a statutory obligation abrogates or supersedes the
employer’s common law duty or that it defines or measures his common law duty either by clarifying it
74 O’Rourke v Camden London Borough Council [1998] AC 188.
75 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [25]; see also Stovin v Wise
[1996] AC 923, 952–953 (Lord Hoffmann).
76 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [38].
77 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
78 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465.
79 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410.
80 Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1358.
81 Non-ferrous Metals (Melting and Founding) Regulations 1962, reg 13(1)(c).
82 See Franklin v Gramophone Co Ltd [1948] 1 KB 542; compare Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743.
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or by cutting it down – or indeed by extending it. It is not necessarily exhaustive of that duty or
co-extensive with it … The statutory obligation may exceed the duty at common law or it may fall short
of it or it may equal it.83
As has been highlighted above, the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper held that the relevant
statute may be the only source of duties.84 Whilst this may be true in a given case, this does not
preclude the possibility of proximity arising outside the scope of statutory duty imposed. This
possibility became a reality in another decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Fullowka v
Pinkerton’s of Canada85 (Fullowka), a decade later. In Fullowka, explosives had been set up in a mine
by certain miners on strike, resulting in the deaths of miners who were in the mine. The Supreme
Court held that the territorial Government owed a duty of care to the deceased miners for failing to
prevent the latters’ deaths by the acts of third parties (the miners on strike who had set up the
explosives) – though the claim was eventually dismissed on other grounds. The establishment of a
common law duty of care was due to the presence of a specific relationship between the parties set
against a statutory framework. The Mining Safety Act86 placed the responsibility on mine owners,
management and workers to observe safety regulations. The role of the mining inspectors belonging to
the Government was essentially to ensure that the mine owners, managers and workers discharged
their obligation to comply with the statute, and to order the immediate cessation of work in a mine that
the inspectors considered unsafe. A prima facie duty arose based essentially on the determinate class
of persons affected, the direct and personal interactions between the Government and the deceased
miners, the presence of specific risks to the deceased miners, and the Government’s knowledge of the
risks. In tandem with Fullowka, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Taylor v Canada (Attorney
General)87 stated that statute is not normally the source of private law duties, and where the statutory
scheme itself does not foreclose the existence of a duty of care, the court can and should examine the
interactions between the statutory body and the plaintiff.88
This is consistent with one of the central themes of this paper, that is, that the Anns framework is
indispensable for determining the common law duty of care in cases involving statutory duties. In
other words, it is not the statute as such, but the judicial declarations applying the Anns framework,
which ultimately create or establish the common law duty of care. In this regard, the comments of
Lewis Klar are instructive:
It might very well be, for example, that the statute’s provisions themselves, without more, place the
parties in a relationship which the common law of negligence recognises as a proximate relationship.
This does not mean that the statute creates the private law duty. It means only that the statute creates a
relationship which the common law recognizes as a duty of care relationship ...89
The common law duty in negligence is based on reasonable care, unlike breach of statutory duty
where the standard imposed on the statutory body or entity ultimately depends on the statutory
language as interpreted by the courts. The standard for breach of statutory duty may be strict, that is,
a breach arises without any need to show an absence of reasonable care. Singapore and New Zealand
courts, following the English common law, allow for a separate tort of breach of statutory duty, whilst
83 Bux v Slough Metals Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1358, 1369.
84 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537; [2001] SCC 79, [43].
85 Fullowka v Pinkerton’s of Canada [2010] 1 SCR 132; [2010] SCC 5.
86 Mining Safety Act, RSNWT 1988, c M-13.
87 Taylor v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] ONCA 479.
88 Taylor v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] ONCA 479, [78]–[79]. See also Heaslip Estate v Mansfield Ski Club Inc. [2009]
310 DLR (4th) 506 (Ontario Court of Appeal), [19]–[20] (Sharpe JA – specific and direct interactions between the plaintiffs and
the government agency responsible for providing air ambulance services which failed to give priority to the plaintiffs’ son’s
medical needs over those of a less severely injured person).
89 Lewis Klar, “The Tort Liability of Public Authorities: The Canadian Experience” in Simone Degeling, James Edelman and
James Goudkamp (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, 2011) 265.
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Canada has abolished the tort.90 This demonstrates, albeit indirectly, that the tort of breach of statutory
duty is ultimately a category of judge-made common law principles which may be declared or
removed by the courts. In lieu of the tort of breach of statutory duty, Canada adopts the approach of
treating a statutory breach as constituting evidence of negligence91 – which is distinct from the
position in the United States that a statutory breach is negligence per se.92
For countries such as New Zealand and Singapore which have retained the tort of breach of
statutory duty, the difference in standards for breach is another good reason for not treating the
statutory duty on par with a common law duty of care. Such a distinction in standards was explicitly
noted in Leighton Contractors Pty Limited v Fox.93 In that case, the principal contractor was held not
to owe a duty of care to the independent contractor (who was injured in the course of work on the site)
to ensure that the latter had undergone occupational and health induction training pursuant to the
Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 (NSW),94 made under the Occupational Health and
Safety Act 2000 (NSW).95 The High Court of Australia stated its reasoning as follows:
While it is true that obligations under statutory or other enactments have relevance to determining the
existence and scope of a duty, it is necessary to exercise caution in translating the obligations imposed
on employers, principal contractors and others under the OHS Act and the Regulation into a duty of
care at common law. This is because, as Gummow J explained in Roads and Traffıc Authority (NSW) v
Dederer [(2007) 234 CLR 330; [2007] HCA 42, 345 [43]], “whatever their scope, all duties of care are
to be discharged by the exercise of reasonable care. They do not impose a more stringent or onerous
burden”.96
Hence, the tort of negligence is distinctive by virtue of this standard of reasonable care, which is
not shared by breach of statutory duty (or any other tort). The standard expected under a statutory duty
varies, depending ultimately on the statutory language and judicial interpretation. Where the statutory
duty imposed is based on strict liability, determining common law duty to take reasonable care based
solely on the approach for tort of breach of statutory duty simpliciter (that is, whether Parliament
intended to confer a private right of action) would be incongruous. Put in another way, the imposition
of a common law duty to take reasonable care would not sit well with parliamentary intention to allow
a private action for a statutory breach based on strict liability.
CREATION AND EXCLUSION OF PRIVATE LAW REMEDY, PRIVATE ACTION, AND
COMMON LAW DUTY: ALL WITHIN THE ANNS FRAMEWORK
We compared above the different approaches to the relationship between statutory duties and duty of
care in negligence: namely, the approach taking the common law duty as subsisting unless the statute
excludes a private law remedy (exclusion), versus the approach of enquiring whether the statute
creates a private law remedy, thereby imposing a common law duty of care (creation). If we were to
analyse duty of care based on the Anns framework, there is, on closer analysis, no inconsistency
between the two approaches. Both approaches can be meaningfully accommodated within the Anns
framework. What we have is a compromise between the prioritisation of the statutory and the common
law positions.
How does the statutory framework fit within the Anns framework? Under the first limb of Anns
comprising the requirement of proximity, the statutory framework should be analysed to examine
90 For a critique of the Canadian abolishment of breach of statutory duty, see Neil Foster, “The Merits of the Civil Action for
Breach of Statutory Duty” (2011) 33 Syd L Rev 67.
91 R v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1983) 143 DLR (3d) 9.
92 ER Thayer, “Public Wrong and Private Action” (1914) 27 Harv LR 317.
93 Leighton Contractors Pty Limited v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1; [2009] HCA 35. Although this is an Australian case, it illustrates
the point clearly.
94 The Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 (NSW) was repealed by Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW),
s 276C.
95 The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) was repealed by Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW), s 276C.
96 Leighton Contractors Pty Limited v Fox (2009) 240 CLR 1; [2009] HCA 35, [49].
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whether there is a sufficiently proximate relationship between the parties with reference to the
statutory intention expressed in the relevant statutory provisions and extrinsic materials. If the only
source of proximity happens to be the statutory provision, then the parliamentary intention would be
the controlling factor for the purpose of ascertaining a common law duty of care. In such an instance,
it is open to the courts to consider whether Parliament had intended to confer a private right of action
and remedy on the plaintiff in question such that a proximate relationship is established between the
parties. Once this requirement is satisfied, there would be a prima facie duty of care under the first
limb of the Anns framework created alongside the statutory duty. Alternatively, the statutory provision
may not be the controlling factor at the first stage. If so, the court has to enquire if factors outside the
statutory framework may be relevant for establishing the prima facie duty of care.
On the assumption that a prima facie duty of care exists under the first limb, the enquiry under the
second limb of Anns is whether policy considerations would negate the duty. In this regard, the
statutory scheme and parliamentary intention would be examined to ascertain whether there are
material policy considerations that would have the effect of excluding the duty arising under the first
limb. The exclusion of the duty would be consistent with the approach of Lords Steyn and Hoffmann
in Gorringe of treating a common law duty as subsisting unless it is excluded by the statute. This is
also in line with the judgement in Tan Juay Pah that if the alleged common law duty of care is found
to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme in question, the effect of the statutory scheme would be to
limit or negate the duty of care.
A point of clarification is, however, appropriate here. As the reader would recall, the Court of
Appeal of Singapore in Tan Juay Pah had stated that, in establishing a common law duty of care, the
court has to find parliamentary intention to confer a private right of action on an individual or class of
persons, as opposed to the general public. This legal requirement can be explained on the particular
facts of that case. There was no other evidence in that case, apart from the statutory framework of the
Workplace Safety and Health Act and Regulations, which would go towards fulfilling the requirement
of proximity. As such, the statutory duty appeared to be the only possible source from which a
common law duty of care may be derived.97 Therefore, on the facts of that case, the existence of a
common law duty of care would be crucially dependent on parliamentary intention to confer a private
right of action. Further, other statements in the same judgement demonstrate that the Court of Appeal
was acutely aware that as a matter of legal principle, parliamentary intention to confer a private right
of action was not the be-all and end-all of a common law duty:
[W]e emphasise that the underlying statutory scheme and the parliamentary intention behind the
enactment of that scheme are not controlling factors in determining whether an alleged common law
duty of care exists concurrently with a statutory duty, but rather go towards negating the alleged
common law duty of care …98
Thus, the statutory regime does not necessarily determine the duty of care issue in all cases but is
merely one, albeit significant, factor to be taken into account. In summary, there is no inconsistency
between the judicial statements premised on the creation or the exclusion of a common law duty or
private law remedy or action. This “dual” approach towards statutory duties and duty of care in
negligence can be accommodated within the Anns framework. This is, in the author’s view, aptly
summed up by May LJ’s statements in Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment & the
Regions99 (Sandhar):
97 Ultimately, however, the Court of Appeal found that Parliament did not intend for the Workplace Safety and Health Act
(Singapore, cap 354A, 2009 rev ed) and Workplace Safety and Health (General Provisions) Regulations (Singapore, cap 354A,
Rg 1, 2007 rev ed) to protect the contractors and sub-contractors from economic losses arising from the alleged negligence of
the authorised examiner of the cranes. Hence, there was no common law duty.
98 Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 549; [2012] SGCA 17, [54].
99 Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2005] 1 WLR 1632.
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[U]nless a statute on its proper construction provides a private law right of action or conversely unless
the statute excludes it, the existence of a common law duty of care depends on unvarnished common
law principles.100
At a more concrete level, the statutory framework interacts with the specific elements of duty of
care in the Anns framework in order to determine if a common law duty of care may be established, an
enquiry to which we shall now focus our attention.
Statutory framework and proximity
The presence and content of statutory duties impact on the requirement of proximity under the first
limb of the Anns framework. Proximity, as mentioned, is essentially about the closeness of the
relationship between the parties. The judicial interpretation of the purpose underlying the statutory
scheme is therefore crucial to discerning the intended scope of the statutory duty insofar as it impacts
on the closeness of the relationship between the parties. Did Parliament, for example, intend the
statute to give rise to a common law duty,101 in particular by reference to a class of persons who are
permitted to recover for breach of the statute,102 and the type of damages103 recoverable by such class
of persons? Did the statute give control or supervision to the person acting under the statutory duty
over the victim? Given the statutory scheme, can it be said that there was voluntary assumption of
responsibility by the person on whom the statutory duty was imposed, or reliance by the victim?
Though the first limb of Anns is focused on proximity, due to the presence of the statutory
framework and the need for discerning statutory purpose, the question of whether a statutory body
should owe a private law duty alongside the statutory framework is also a policy issue within the
province of the legislature.104 In this regard, legislative purpose or policy and proximity inevitably
interact at the first stage of the Anns framework. However, at this first stage, the focus is on how the
statutory purpose or policy affects the interpersonal relationships between the statutory body and the
potential plaintiff to be protected under the statute105 (or “interpersonal justice”), and less on broad
social welfare goals and the weighing of competing moral claims, which are the focus of the second
stage of the Anns framework.
Courts, in examining the purpose of a statute and the identifiable class of persons intended to be
protected by the statute, have ruled that auditors preparing audited accounts under the legislation on
companies only owe a duty to the company which engaged their services, and not to individual
investors in the audited company.106 In similar vein, it has been held that Commissioners of
Deposit-taking companies and the Registrar of Mortgage Brokers do not owe common law duties to
individual depositors107 and individual investors108 respectively. Contractors and sub-contractors have
been held responsible for workplace safety under the workplace safety legislation109 due to their
operational control of the workplaces.110 Conversely, building authorities, to the extent that they do
not exercise any control over the daily operations of city councils under the relevant statute,111 are less
100 Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment & the Regions [2005] 1 WLR 1632, [37] (Thomas and Brooke LJJ
agreeing).
101 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15.
102 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
103 Resource Piling Pte Ltd v Geospecs Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 485.
104 Taylor v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] ONCA 479.
105 Taylor v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] ONCA 479, [76].
106 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
107 Yuen Kun Yeu v Attorney General of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175.
108 Cooper v Hobart [2001] 3 SCR 537; [2001] SCC 79.
109 Workplace Safety and Health Act (Singapore, cap 354A, 2009 rev ed).
110 Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Moh Seng Cranes Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 360; [2014] SGCA 6, [41].
111 Workplace Safety and Health Act (Singapore, cap 354A, 2009 rev ed).
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likely to owe a corresponding common law duty to the council in question.112 Further, one must not
disregard the historical background to the statutory scheme which may impact on the intended scope
of a common law duty. In Gorringe, the statute in question was dependent on common law
development; at the same time, it served as a source of common law duty.113 The erstwhile common
law duty on the inhabitants to keep the highway in repair had been transferred to the highway
authority via the enactment of the Highways Act 1980, (UK),114 and that interpretation of the limited
statutory duty led the court to hold that there was no duty of care owed by the highway authority to
the injured victim to erect warning signs on the road. Whilst it is accepted that the statutory scheme
may in certain cases such as X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council115 run contrary to the
imposition of a common law duty of care, there is no reason why statutes themselves cannot present
opportunities for further common law development.116 Indeed, the metaphor of “oil and water” to
describe the separate streams of statute and common law is becoming increasingly obsolete. The work
of the legislature and the courts is not necessarily separate and independent but may exhibit evidence
of symbiosis in certain cases.117
In addition, the proximity requirement may, on other occasions, be satisfied by evidence outside
the statutory framework, as illustrated in the Singaporean case of Animal Concerns Research &
Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee118 (Animal Concerns). Here, the duties of the defendant (the site
supervisor) fell outside the ambit of s 10 of the Building Control Act.119 In any event, the Court of
Appeal noted that the statutory provision did not “obviously create” a private cause of action, and the
statutory breach would only attract purely criminal sanctions under the statute. The Court proceeded to
observe that:
[G]iven the rather general terms in which s 10 of the Act is phrased, it is unlikely that the Legislature
had intended, when enacting s 10, to preclude common law civil remedies against negligent site
supervisors or clerks of works.120
There are two important points to note here. First, a common law duty of care was established
despite the fact that the parliament did not intend to confer a private right of action to the victim who
suffered economic loss pursuant to s 10 of the statute. However, the absence of statutory intention to
confer a private right of action was immaterial, as the court had found proximity both in the specific
communications between the parties and in the industry practices relating to the functions of the clerk
of works. Second, as the statute clearly did not exclude a cause of action in negligence, it permitted a
common law duty of care to be established based on those specific communications between the
parties. This is consistent with the dual approach discussed above. A voluntary assumption of
responsibility arose outside of the statutory framework from the defendant’s specific conduct in
procuring the contractor to appoint him as clerk of works and in holding himself out as possessing the
qualifications and skills to discharge the role.121
In fact, the general principle is that if the defendant carries out an act that he is obliged to carry
out under a statute, the defendant is not regarded as voluntarily assuming responsibility for that act.
112 North Shore City Council v The Attorney-General [2012] 3 NZLR 341; [2012] NZSC 49.
113 A Burrows, “The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations” (2012) 128 LQR 232, 233.
114 Highways Act 1980, (UK) c 66, s 41(1).
115 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] UKHL 9.
116 J Beatson, “Has the Common Law a Future” (1997) 56(2) Camb LJ 291, 309–310.
117 See generally, Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, “The Rise of the Common Law in Statutory Interpretation of Tort Law
Reform Legislation: Oil and Water or a Milky Pond?” (2013) 21 TLJ 126.
118 Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146; [2011] SGCA 2.
119 Building Control Act (Singapore, cap 29, 1999 rev ed).
120 Animal Concerns Research & Education Society v Tan Boon Kwee [2011] 2 SLR 146; [2011] SGCA 2, [81].
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Assumption of responsibility must be “conscious and volitional”,122 “considered” or “deliberate”,123
and as such runs contrary to the notion of a responsibility imposed by statute. That said, the absence
of a voluntary assumption of responsibility does not, however, prevent the defendant from owing a
duty of care in negligence on other bases. First, the defendant could, in principle, undertake a
responsibility over and beyond that statutorily imposed upon him. Second, the common law duty of
care may be based on evidence of voluntary assumption of responsibility independent of the statutory
regime (such as voluntary assumption of responsibility through specific communications and
interactions between the parties). Apart from Animal Concerns, R v Imperial Tobacco Canada124
(Imperial Tobacco) is another case in point. There the Canadian Government made negligent
misrepresentations concerning the health benefits of low-tar cigarettes and was negligent in the design
of certain low-tar tobacco strains. Under s 4(1) of the Department of Health Act,125 the Minister of
Health was under a duty in respect of the “promotion and preservation of the health of the people of
Canada”.126 It was held that a duty of care could arise from the specific interactions between the
government and the plaintiff so long as they did not conflict with the statute. For the negligent
misrepresentation claim, there was proximity between Canada and tobacco companies based on the
fact that Canada was adviser to the finite number of manufacturers and companies. For the claim in
negligent design, there were specific commercial relations between Canada and the tobacco companies
and consumers in respect of the design of tobacco strains.
When voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance arise in the context of specific
relationships between the parties, such assumption of responsibility is typically based on the
defendant’s implied promise or voluntary choice, coupled with the plaintiff’s knowledge of the
promise or choice made by the defendant. In Spandeck, the twin criteria of voluntary assumption of
responsibility and reliance (as two sides of the same coin)127 were particularly useful under the first
limb of proximity, in negligence claims for economic loss. This composite model of voluntary
assumption of responsibility and reliance invariably focuses on specific reliance rather than general
reliance.
General reliance refers to the dependence or expectation by a member of the public or a large
section of the community that a particular statutory duty imposed on a statutory authority will be
performed, such as the control of air traffic, safety inspection of aircraft, and fire-fighting.128 In cases
involving statutory authorities under a duty to act, the concept of general reliance is arguably more
relevant.129 Nevertheless, the concept of general reliance has not acquired a firm footing in the
common law jurisdictions. In Sandhar, the Court held that there was no general assumption of
responsibility by the Department of Transport, Environment & the Regions to all road users to ensure
that all or any trunk roads would be salted in freezing conditions. The concept of assumption of
responsibility is tied to a “particular relationship with an individual or individuals”.130 Hence, a
general expectation cannot alone support an assumption of responsibility. There was no general
reliance by motorists on the highway authority to have salted a potentially icy road, even if they had
122 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831, 870C (Lord Jauncey); Chu Said Thong v Vision Law LLC [2014] SGHC 160, [166]
(Vinodh Coomaraswamy J).
123 Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank plc [2006] 3 WLR 1; [2006] UKHL 28, [73] (Lord Walker).
124 R v Imperial Tobacco Canada [2011] 3 SCR 45; [2011] SCC 42.
125 Department of Health Act, SC 1996, c 8.
126 R v Imperial Tobacco Canada [2011] 3 SCR 45; [2011] SCC 42, [50].
127 However, there were exceptions to this composite picture, for example, Ministry of Housing and Local Government v Sharp
[1970] 2 QB 223, 268–269, where Lord Denning MR ruled that there was no necessity to show voluntary assumption of
responsibility before a duty of care will arise where there is evidence of the defendant’s constructive knowledge of the
plaintiff’s reliance on his statement.
128 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 464 (Mason J), overruled without disturbing this point.
129 Bruce Feldthusen, “Simplifying Canadian Negligence Actions against Public Authorities – or Maybe Not” (2012) 20 Tort L
Rev 176, 184.
130 Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2005] 1 WLR 1632, [43].
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known that the highway authority salted roads in icy conditions.131 This proposition applies even to
representations made to the public by a public authority.132
In the Australian decision of Pyrenees Shire Council v Day,133 the notion of general reliance
based on community expectations was regarded as a fiction.134 RA Buckley has, however, argued that
“[t]he concept of general reliance involves an overt appeal to experience and to intuitive notions of
responsibility. Whatever the difficulties associated with it, it is therefore more in accordance with the
nature of law of tort than a search for an unexpressed legislative intention.”135 General reliance on the
performance of statutory duties has been applied, albeit in limited circumstances, in England,136
Canada137 and New Zealand.138 It has also been applied by certain judges in Australia in determining
duty of care, in conjunction with other factors as the vulnerability of the individual plaintiff,139 and the
knowledge of the statutory authority that the plaintiff will suffer harm.140
In Canada, the concept of general reliance, which was employed in the Supreme Court case of
Laurentide Motels Ltd v Beauport (City) to find that a duty of care was owed by firefighters, was based
on:
[T]he expectations created in taxpayers who have assumed the cost of acquiring a firefighting service,
and who accordingly have every reason to think they will be able to rely on that service to fight fires on
their properties. If such taxpayers do not expect all fires to be prevented, they can at least expect to rely
on the municipality to fight fires as effectively as possible …141
In New Zealand, the main applications of the principle of general reliance have been in relation to
real property matters. In Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Limited,142 a
common law duty of care was imposed on a local authority in respect of the issuance of a land
information memorandum pursuant to a statute.143 Prior to the purchase, the purchaser sought and
obtained from the defendant council the memorandum containing inaccurate information, which
reinforced a prior misrepresentation. The relevant statute provided for the right of a person to apply to
a territorial authority (such as the defendant) for a memorandum in relation to land matters and
contained the provision that, “in the absence of proof to the contrary, a land information memorandum
shall be sufficient evidence of the correctness … of any information included in it”.144 The Supreme
Court of New Zealand took the view that the statutory provision encouraged general reliance on the
accuracy of information contained in it. We see a similar recourse to general reliance or expectation in
Invercargill, where the Privy Council held that persons responsible for the construction of buildings or
supervision of same owed a duty of care to building owners.145 It specifically cited the New Zealand
case of Hope v Manukau City Council:
131 Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2005] 1 WLR 1632, [44].
132 Taylor v Canada (Attorney General) [2012] ONCA 479.
133 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; [1998] HCA 3.
134 See Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; [1998] HCA 3, [19] (Brennan CJ).
135 RA Buckley, “Negligence in the Public Sphere: is Clarity Possible?” (2000) 51 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 25, 34.
136 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057; [2004] UKHL 15, [43] (Lord Hoffmann); Stovin
v Wise [1996] AC 923, 954 (Lord Hoffmann).
137 Laurentide Motels Ltd v Beauport (City) [1989] 1 SCR 705.
138 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] 2 NZLR 726; [2012] NZSC 11.
139 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; [1998] HCA 3, 361 (Toohey J), 370–371 (McHugh J).
140 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330; [1998] HCA 3, 371 (McHugh J).
141 Laurentide Motels Ltd v Beauport (City) [1989] 1 SCR 705, 770.
142 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11; [2012] NZSC 11.
143 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11; [2012] NZSC 11, [87].
144 Local Government Offıcial Information and Meetings Act 1987 (NZ), s 44A(5).
145 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] AC 624, 639.
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I would be prepared to draw the inference as a matter of common sense that the average prudent
purchaser of a new residential flat expects that the By-laws and regulations will have been complied
with ... In our Cities there would be few citizens who would be unaware of the necessity for buildings
to comply with the By-laws and health regulations and unaware of the control which City Councils
exercise over building works.146
Statutory framework and policy considerations
Policy considerations under the second limb of the Anns framework may limit or negate a duty of care
that has been established under the first limb. The overarching consideration is that the common law
duty of care to be imposed must not be inconsistent with the intention of Parliament.147 With specific
reference to the statutory framework, the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Tan Juay Pah stated that
“the imposition of the alleged common law duty of care should not be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme concerned and the statutory duties owed under that scheme”.148 Apart from respect for the
rule that statutes prevail over common law principles in the event of a conflict, it may be argued that
the underlying rationale of the insistence on consistency between a common law duty of care and the
statutory scheme concerned is to “preserve the coherence” of both legal principles and statutory
schemes that govern particular conduct or relationships between the parties.149
There are at least four ways in which policy considerations can negate or limit a prima facie duty
with specific reference to cases involving statutory schemes.150 First, a common law duty of care is
unlikely to arise where the statutory framework potentially sets up a conflict between the alleged
common law duty owed to the claimant and those owed to a different party or parties under the
statute.151 In the Canadian case of Syl Apps, the negligence claim against a treatment centre and a
social worker by the parents of a child removed from the home and placed in the centre was dismissed
due to potentially conflicting duties towards parents and child. The treatment centre was under a
statutory duty pursuant to the Child and Family Services Act152 to protect the best interests of the
child, and this would conflict with the common law duty (if it were imposed) alleged in favour of the
parents. Similar reasoning was applied in B v Attorney General of New Zealand153 for the decision
that the Director General of Social Welfare did not owe a common law duty to the parents in respect
of claims by both parents and children that the defendant was negligent in carrying out its statutory
duty of investigating complaints of sexual abuse by child victims. In addition to conflicts between a
potential common law duty of care owed to litigants and statutory duties owed to other individual
parties, it has also been stated in Imperial Tobacco that the common law duty cannot conflict with the
statutory duty owed by the public authority to the public.154
The second way in which policy considerations can negate or limit a duty of care refers to a
situation where the imposition of a duty of care may “undermine the effectiveness of the duties
imposed by the statute”,155 or “distort the performance of the functions of the statutory body”.156
146 Hope v Manukau City Council (Unreported, Supreme Court of New Zealand, Chilwell J, 2 August 1976) 31 (emphasis
added).
147 Rowley v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] 1 WLR 2861, [61] (Dyson LJ).
148 Tan Juay Pah v Kimly Construction Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 549; [2012] SGCA 17, [53]. See also Harris v Evans [1998] 1
WLR 1285, 1297, applying X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; [1995] UKHL 9; Phelps v Hillingdon
London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619, 650.
149 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; [2001] HCA 59, [50].
150 There are, of course, other policy considerations relating to the opening of floodgates and indeterminacy of liability.
151 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633; D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] 2 AC
373; [2005] UKHL 23; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35, [231] (Gummow and Kirby JJ).
152 Child and Family Services Act, RSO 1990, c C-11.
153 B v Attorney General of New Zealand [2004] 3 NZLR 45.
154 R v Imperial Tobacco Canada [2011] 3 SCR 45; [2011] SCC 42, [44].
155 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540; [2002] HCA 54, [78].
156 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 59, [216].
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The third limiting policy category covers cases where there are viable alternative remedies under
the statute.157 Further, where the commencement and conduct of adversarial legal processes pursuant
to a statute or regulations are involved, the court would be hesitant to impose a common law duty.158
Fourthly, Parliament may express its intention by clear language to immunise a statutory body
from liability under a statute. Where a statute expressly immunises the statutory body from liability
save in specified circumstances such as the absence of good faith,159 imposing a common law duty
would clearly be inconsistent with the statute. The Supreme Court of New Zealand in McNamara v
Auckland City Council160 held that the absence of “good faith” cannot be equated with “want of
diligence” (or negligence); otherwise, the immunity provision would be rendered devoid of “any real
meaning”.161 Another example is found in Edwards v Law Society of Upper Canada,162 where the
Law Society Act163 immunised the officials of the Law Society in respect of their exercise in good faith
of the duties and powers under the statute. Section 9 of the Act164 further stipulates for statutory
immunity of the Law Society and pre-empts compensation in situations falling outside the scope of
lawyers’ professional indemnity insurance165 and the lawyers’ fund for client compensation.166
However, where the statutory body has acted with gross and serious carelessness, the good faith clause
would not operate to immunise the defendant.167
It is not the case, however, that policy considerations will always negate the common law duty of
care. The statutory purpose may be consistent with, promote, or complement the alleged common law
duty. In Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Moh Seng Cranes Pte Ltd,168 the Singapore Court of Appeal held
that the main purpose of the workplace safety legislation in that case was to strengthen the
responsibilities of contractors and sub-contractors at the construction site, which purpose,
“complement[s] the very aims of the common law tort of negligence”.169 In Canada, the new tort of
negligent investigation in Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board170 was based on
the close and direct relationship between the police officer and the particular suspect, taking into
account the suspect’s liberty and reputation. In addition to the absence of alternative remedies
157 Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978.
158 Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority [2009] 1 AC 853; Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1995]
QB 335; Business Computers International Ltd v Registrar of Companies [1988] Ch 229.
159 South East Enterprises (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hean Nerng Holdings Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 119, [51]; McNamara v Auckland
City Council [2012] 3 NZLR 701; [2012] NZSC 34; Edwards v Law Society of Upper Canada [2001] 3 SCR 562; [2001] SCC
80.
160 McNamara v Auckland City Council [2012] 3 NZLR 701; [2012] NZSC 34.
161 McNamara v Auckland City Council [2012] 3 NZLR 701; [2012] NZSC 34, [160]. Section 50(3) of the 1991 Building Act
obliged territorial authorities (such as the Council) to accept such certificates as establishing compliance and the territorial
authorities are protected from civil liability if they acted in “good faith” in reliance on such certificates.
162 Edwards v Law Society of Upper Canada [2001] 3 SCR 562; [2001] SCC 80.
163 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L-8.
164 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L-8, s 9 reads: “No action or other proceedings for damages shall be instituted against the
Treasurer or any bencher, official of the Society or person appointed in Convocation for any act done in good faith in the
performance or intended performance of any duty or in the exercise or in the intended exercise of any power under this Act, a
regulation, a by-law or a rule of practice and procedure, or for any neglect or default in the performance or exercise in good
faith of any such duty or power.”
165 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L-8, s 61.
166 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L-8, s 51.
167 Finney v Barreau du Quebec [2004] 2 SCR 17; [2004] SCC 31.
168 Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Moh Seng Cranes Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 360; [2014] SGCA 6. See also Attorney-General v
Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262, 284 (the tortious duty does not conflict with any other duty by the department and its officers but
“enhances” it).
169 Jurong Primewide Pte Ltd v Moh Seng Cranes Pte Ltd [2014] 2 SLR 360; [2014] SGCA 6, [41].
170 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] 3 SCR 129; [2007] SCC 41.
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available to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Canada in that case emphasised that imposing a
common law duty would be consistent with the values of “liberty and fair process”171 under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.172
CONCLUSION
Given their diverse origins, the relationship between statutory duties and the common law duty of care
is not expected to be, and is certainly not, straightforward. There is no necessary connection between
statutory duties and the existence of a common law duty of care in negligence. The presence of a
statutory duty does not mean that a corresponding common law duty will be created. Conversely, a
wider common law duty may, on occasions, be created notwithstanding the absence of a statutory duty
based on a particular factual matrix.
Nonetheless, statutory duties provide the context and background in which a common law duty
may arise. Yet, the common law duty of care in negligence must be ultimately premised on fulfilling
the elements in the Anns framework. Unlike the tort of breach of statutory duty, the duty of care in
negligence is principally based on a judge-made principle and not necessarily premised on a statutory
duty. Further, the standard expected of the defendant in the tort of negligence is that he or she takes
reasonable care, unlike the variable standard for the tort of breach of statutory duty.
The apparently divergent judicial approaches towards statutory duties as to whether the statute
must create a common law duty, or whether a common law duty subsists unless it is excluded by the
statute, can be meaningfully accommodated within the Anns framework as applied in Canada, New
Zealand, and Singapore. Under the first limb of the Anns framework, the statutory duty with the
attendant parliamentary intention may be an important legal source to determine if there is sufficient
proximity between the parties (such as by delineating the intended scope of duty, the protected class of
persons and interests, and ascertaining whether voluntary assumption of responsibility and reliance
exist). If sufficient proximity exists, this will lead to the creation of a prima facie duty of care at the
first stage. It should also be noted that evidence outside the statutory framework may also give rise to
a common law duty of care based on other proximity factors (such as voluntary assumption of
responsibility, reliance, and control). Under the second limb of the Anns framework, the statute may
reinforce the prima facie duty of care; alternatively, the statute may have the effect of overriding the
duty if it is interpreted as excluding a private right of action or remedy or a common law duty of care.
This takes place when the imposition of the alleged common law duty would be regarded as
inconsistent with the duties under the statutory scheme due to, amongst others, conflicting statutory
duties owed to other parties, alternative statutory remedies, and explicit statutory immunities.
171 Hill v Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board [2007] 3 SCR 129; [2007] SCC 41, [38].
172 Canada Act 1982 (UK) c 11, sch B pt I (“Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”). See also Couch v Attorney-General
[2008] 3 NZLR 725; [2008] NZSC 45, [58] (Elias J – that in respect of the Probation Service which was obliged to undertake
a statutory duty, a duty of care in negligence would “march hand in hand” with its statutory responsibilities); South Pacific
Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants and Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282, 298 (Cooke P – that
statutory regulation “may encourage the court to hold that certain interests warrant protection”).
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